Extension vulnerability / Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce

Version 4.1.5 closes the hole. It does not tell you who already came through it.

The Rootways Authorize.net CIM extension for Magento 2 had an Apple Pay endpoint that fetched any URL a visitor gave it, with no login. Attackers used it on 15 November to read env.php, get into the database, create an admin user and plant a card skimmer. Rootways shipped the fix on 17 November. Upgrading stops new attacks: it removes nothing that is already on your server.

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9.2CVSS 4.0, critical, no login needed
8,272Requests to the endpoint on one store, 15 Nov
14 hFrom first probe to live skimmer

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Answered within five business hours, Monday to Friday, Eastern. We never ask for credentials by email.

Why upgrading to 4.1.5 is not the end of it

The fix makes the Apple Pay endpoint talk to Apple's servers only, over HTTPS. That closes the door. It does not lock out an attacker who already has your database password, your encryption key and an admin account.

Your secrets were readable

The endpoint returned whatever it fetched, including local files through file://. That means app/etc/env.php: database credentials and the Magento encryption key. Those stay valid after the upgrade until you rotate them.

Internal services were reachable

Through the same endpoint an attacker can talk to Redis, Memcached, a database manager or cloud metadata running on the server. In the case Sansec investigated, that was Adminer on port 8082, the Cloudways default.

The skimmer lives in the database

The attacker added a skimmer to the HTML head setting in the admin and a web shell in pub/. Neither is part of the extension, so updating the extension leaves both in place.

Which stores are exposed, by platform

This is a third-party Magento 2 extension, not an Adobe core flaw. Exposure depends on whether the module is installed, its version, and whether Apple Pay was switched on.

Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce with the module

Every version before 4.1.5 is affected, from 4.0.0 to 4.1.4. Adobe security patches do not touch it. If Apple Pay was enabled in the module, Sansec's advice is to assume compromise and investigate.

Stores on Cloudways or with a database tool

The breach Sansec documented ran on Cloudways, where Adminer listens on port 8082 by default. Any host with an unprotected Redis, Memcached or database manager on the same server gives the attacker the same next step.

Module installed but Apple Pay off

Sansec's interim mitigation is to disable Apple Pay in the module. Treat that as a stopgap. Upgrade to 4.1.5 anyway, and scan if Apple Pay was ever turned on.

WooCommerce, Shopify and BigCommerce

Not affected by this flaw: the extension only exists for Magento 2. If you run several stores on mixed platforms, we check the Magento ones as part of the scan.

What the free scan actually is

A short call, a forensic scan of your store, and a written finding. Three steps, no charge, and no obligation to buy anything at the end of it.

01

A fifteen minute call

We confirm your Magento version, the Rootways module version, whether Apple Pay was on, where you are hosted, and who your technical contact is. You talk to a developer, not a sales queue.

02

eComscan on your store

eComscan is the forensic scanner built by Sansec, the firm that published this attack. We run it as a listed Sansec partner to find web shells and skimmers, then check access logs, admin users and config for the published indicators.

03

A written finding

What we found, what it means, and what remediation would cost. If the store is clean, you have it in writing and there is nothing to pay.

How to check your Magento store yourself

These checks come from the Sansec analysis. If any of them returns something, stop and request the scan.

  • Check the module version: composer show rootways/module-authorizecim or grep '"version"' app/code/Rootways/Authorizecim/composer.json. Anything below 4.1.5 is vulnerable.
  • Check whether Apple Pay is on: bin/magento config:show payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active.
  • Search your web server access logs for /rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index with a validationUrl that is not on apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com.
  • Look for pub/media_sync.php, var/report/i08*_*.php, var/report/cache_report.so and /tmp/i086_*.
  • Review the admin_user table for accounts nobody on your team created.
  • Check core_config_data for changes to design/head/includes, and search it for sslip.io or 45.86.62.180.

What we need from you, before you have to ask

eComscan runs on the server, so the scan needs temporary SSH access to your production environment. That is a real ask, and we would rather put it on this page than spring it on you in the call.

How we take it

  • A limited user, not root
  • Shared through a password manager, never by email
  • Time-boxed and revoked after the scan
  • Revocation confirmed in writing
  • Mutual NDA signed beforehand

Or give us nothing at all

If you would rather not grant access, we walk your own sysadmin through the scan on a screen share. No credentials change hands.

If your database password or encryption key may have been read, we also tell you in what order to rotate them so checkout keeps working.

Sansec lists us. That is not a badge we made ourselves.

Sansec is the security firm that found this flaw and reported it to Rootways. Their partner directory describes what we do in their words, not ours: managed Sansec security, eComscan, Shield deployment, alert handling, and malware removal for compromised stores.

View our listing on sansec.io
15Years in ecommerce
20+Certified developers in-house
300+Businesses grown online
EN / FRBilingual team
MTLMontreal, Eastern time

Questions merchants are asking this week

What is the Rootways Authorize.net CIM vulnerability?

CVE-2026-130583 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the Apple Pay merchant validation controller of the Rootways Authorize.net CIM extension for Magento 2. The endpoint /rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index fetched any validationUrl with curl, without checking host or protocol, and returned the result to the visitor. It needs no login and scores 9.2 on CVSS 4.0.

Which versions are affected, and which version fixes it?

All versions before 4.1.5 are affected, including 4.1.4 and 4.0.0. Rootways released 4.1.5 on 17 November 2026, one day after Sansec reported the flaw. Rootways also published a two-file patch for stores that cannot upgrade right away.

Has it been exploited?

Yes. Sansec investigated a Magento 2.4.8 store on Cloudways running version 4.0.0 with Apple Pay enabled. On 15 November it received 8,272 requests to the Apple Pay endpoint from 19 IP addresses. The attacker read env.php, logged in to Adminer, created an admin user, planted a web shell and injected a card skimmer in about 14 hours.

We upgraded to 4.1.5. Why scan?

The upgrade stops new requests through the endpoint. It does not remove a web shell, an extra admin account or a skimmer stored in the database, and it does not change a database password or encryption key that was already read.

Is this an Adobe Commerce core vulnerability?

No. It is in a third-party extension from Rootways, so Adobe security patches do not fix it. Both Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce are affected when the module is installed.

What should we do today if we run the module?

Upgrade to 4.1.5 or apply the Rootways patch. Until then, disable Apple Pay in the module and flush the cache, or block the endpoint unless the validationUrl is an HTTPS URL on apple-pay-gateway*.apple.com. If Apple Pay was enabled, rotate the database password and encryption key, review admin users, and scan for web shells and skimmers.

Does the scan really cost nothing?

Yes. The call, the scan and the written finding are free. Remediation is quoted separately, after you have seen what was found, and you are free to take that finding to anyone.

Do you need root access?

We ask for the least privilege the scan will run under, and we tell you exactly what that is before you create anything. If you would rather not grant access at all, we guide your own team through it instead.

Source: Sansec Forensics Team, Rootways Authorize.net CIM: Apple Pay SSRF exploited on Magento stores, 17 November 2026. CVE record: CVE-2026-130583, published 17 November 2026.

The endpoint needed no login. Find out who used it.

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